

things, to learn by doing; the latter presumes a period of planning followed by the implementation of the project designed beforehand. Epstein considers the test and learn approach to be inherent to a generalist mindset and to be the most effective in the long run, as it enables flexibility and adjusting to the situation at hand, compared to the plan and implement approach, which suffers from rigidity and the flaws of long-term planning.

Epstein's main arguments in support of the generalist mindset are interesting to read and at first easy to agree with. However, there are major weaknesses. First, the evidence supporting his claims too often sound like they have been cherry-picked to reinforce the argumentation. Second, it is difficult to draw a causal link between range and success. Factors other than a generalist mindset could be at play. For example, detachment from one's passions might be more relevant than range in achieving success. An alternative argument to 'range versus specialisation' could be 'attachment versus detachment'. Third, Epstein does not discuss much how a generalist or specialist mindset comes about. The emphasis is placed on learning and practice and how these can help develop range. However, it might be that a generalist or specialist mindset are strongly related to a certain combination of intelligence and personality traits. For example, openness to new experiences might enhance the likelihood of an individual adopting the generalist mindset. If this is so, how much range can be learned? Can one shift from a generalist to a specialist mindset during life?

Overall, 'range' is like an airport book, with a nice cover, a catchy title, and a good argument well supported by the overall narrative that makes it pleasurable to read. Moreover, in a time in which hyper-specialisation seems to be the rule and repetitive jobs are being automated by artificial intelligence, some thoughts on the merits of range and how it might be a safety net to

robotisation are welcome. Therefore, the book makes for a good read in order to better grasp how a mindset based on range is constructed and how compared to hyper-specialisation it might grant some critical advantages in contemporary society. As the full saying goes: 'Jack of all trades, master of none, but oftentimes better than master of one.' There seems to be some truth in this that is worth exploring.

Risto Conte Keivabu

risto.contekeivabu@gmail.com,

risto.conte@eui.eu

European University Institute, Florence

Julia Moses: *The First Modern Risk: Workplace Accidents and the Origins of European Social States*

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Trying to unpack the umbrella concept of the 'welfare state', an increasingly voluminous scholarship looks at the historically gradual accumulation of policies responding to national grievances. Picking up the gauntlet, Julia Moses delves into the history of compensation for workplace accidents, which formed 'an essential yet often neglected foundation of the subsequent history of European statehood' (p. 4). The depth of the research is impressive. Above and beyond process tracing in three complex cases, namely Britain, Germany, and Italy, the book also takes into account emerging transnational discourses, epistemic communities and diffusion (p. 12). Though the central emphasis is on the 'historical role of government in managing social risk' (p. 3), the author's ultimate aim is to transcend conventional modernisation theory by looking at the co-constitutive relationship of agency, structure, and contingency.

Unlike the logic of industrialism or power resource models of various types, which offer cross-country comparisons to

test the causal strength of isolated variables, Moses's book provides a comparative window into experiences of grappling with modernity (p. 14). The central point is that rather than assuming a specific type of targeted intervention, materialised or not across multiple cases, the author's comparison is grounded on the implications of thinking in terms of 'risk' (p. 17). Thus, from the outset Moses argues that the interventionist stance of modernising states in the late 19th-early 20th century is not merely a corollary of modernisation (as argued by Flora and Heidenheimer (eds), [1990]). Rather, Moses highlights that governments proactively worked together with a wide range of actors trying to pinpoint the boundaries between workplace obligations, individual risk, and social risk (p. 8). This opens up analytical space to dissect across similar instances of dealing with the fallout of industrialisation, the way(s) in which legal-normative standards of 'social problems' arose and were debated. It is precisely in this line of thought that the author argues for a type of cultural sensitivity to policy making wherein 'the creation of Europe's social states paralleled the birth of its nation-states' (pp. 8–9).

Chapters 1 and 2 map the start of policy drift, as Britain, Germany, and Italy all begin from relying primarily on civil law, but change their institutional outlook from the 1870s (pp. 22–23). Quite clearly, up to a certain degree, the logic of industrialism does have its merit, since Britain's comparatively earlier responsiveness to workplace accidents is a consequence of its earlier industrialisation (p. 28). At the same time, however, the author is careful in delineating her argument, because despite consistent early efforts towards reform, Britain displays huge variations in terms of the application of the new laws (p. 30). Nevertheless, the reforms did open up multiple avenues for injured British workers who, in the mid-19th century, could now seek recourse not only through civil law or the old poor

boards but also through the new area of accident law (p. 33). By contrast, Germany's more indirect response was linked to a specific developmental vision of modernity – railways were the first source of debates owing to their central place in the economic imaginary in the early 19th century (p. 36). This was maintained and even bolstered in post-unification Germany, setting the scene for a *national liability law* in the 1880s (p. 38). Italian debates on work accidents also started from the issue of protecting workers in what seemed to be a particularly dangerous facet of modernisation [p. 41]. Yet, unlike in Germany, where statistics were only gathered ex post, Italian state- and nation-builders, like their British counterparts, started gathering data as part of the initial debate (p. 51).

The book's dialogue is with conventional modernisation theory, as Moses makes a strong case against the functionalism of most arguments on welfare state development. Immediately visible from the first chapter, though essentially present throughout the entire book, is the argument that in *unsettled times*, elites – governments, parliaments, or bureaucracies (the latter holding a particularly central place in Moses's argumentation (p. 8)) – do not simply provide benefits for at-risk groups. Rather, elites proactively chose particular distributions of winners and losers [Vanhuysse 2006, 2007]. This is why a strong point of Moses's analysis is that all three cases involved a complex debate wherein the emerging social policy relied on ideas about the right social order stemming from other social spheres [Kaufmann 2013; Vanhuysse 2009]. The most noteworthy case presented in the book is the impact of the discovery of the second law of thermodynamics (entropy), which became a key pillar of physical understanding of work. This replaced the idea of accidents being a result of human agency and free will with a view of risk that relates to the process of work itself (p. 56). In addition, focusing on

the role of elites acknowledges that international communities have from their very first emergence greatly influenced national political canvases. For accident insurance, emerging transnational communities of statisticians and practitioners greatly contributed to the late-19th-century ideational shift that impacted Europe in its entirety (p. 53).

Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the simultaneity of dilemmas unleashed by modernisation. By the late 19th century, while most Western countries were dealing with the fallout of industrialisation, new problems were also becoming visible such as the gap between early and late industrialisers, or the fraught relationship between national unification and the socio-economic fragmentation caused by industrial capitalism. This is why German social insurance was conceived in national, cultural, and often competitive terms (p. 62). The government essentially latched on to a specific understanding of the state-society relationship, one which both diluted the allure of revolutionary social democracy (p. 63) and was also a 'uniquely German method for addressing occupational risk' (p. 71). Furthermore, sharing risks across the country between various occupations held the unique potential to foment a feeling of national belonging (p. 94). For Italian state-makers, troubled with the underdevelopment of their country, social insurance would not only solve the discrete issue of the accident question, but via state-building, it would in fact 'solve' late development itself (p. 83). This seems to have been the staple of the Italian debate – what industries to cover (p. 94) – because of overarching anxieties vis-à-vis the *national economy* (p. 95). Observers in Britain pointed to German legislation as the epitome of modernity, thus raising public anxiety about a type of late development in social policy terms (pp. 72–73). At the same time, however, particularly because of Britain's early industrialisation and thus pre-existing attempts at

dealing with its fallout, the British Workmen's Compensation Act from 1897 was ultimately a more market-based solution that blended common law, classical liberalism, the tradition of friendly societies, and other voluntary arrangements (p. 78)

The author's fine point is that commentators from that era used modernisation questions to define what made their time a unique stage of history [Case 2016]. To achieve such a dynamic understanding, Moses relies on a plethora of sources that range from governmental documents, to the 'grey literature of bureaucrats', to parliamentary debates and trade union archives (pp. 18–19). The breadth of sources allows the author to fully grasp the depth of the debates around modernity, industrialisation, and social policy. Perhaps the only lingering issue that permeates the book is that while the modernity-social policy nexus is seen as multipolar, nationalism and nation-building, which feature quite prominently, are mostly seen through a state-building lens. Though it is beyond doubt that social policy was a key component of nation-state building, nationalism is a much more fluid and contested ideational construction [see Brubaker 1996]. Therefore, the contribution of nationalism qua political ideology to the conceptual canvas of social policy is not so easily pinned down [Beland and Petersen (eds.) 2014]. While pre-existing forms of solidarity offer a solid basis for the implementation of a state-wide welfare net, social policies also proactively create new identities that are then top-down defined as 'national' by actors who constantly remould the polity. This does not, however, take much away from the impressive dynamism of Moses's analysis. Rather, it further highlights the book's central argument that modernisation unfolded through an open, multifaceted series of debates.

Chapter 5 analyses the social questions in the early 20th century in a context of global migration, imperial expansion, and

increased movement towards international norms (p. 164). As industrialisation deepened and capitalism internationalised in the early 20th century, boundaries between nationals and foreigners were thus increasingly difficult to juggle, which led to changes both in terms of policy coverage and institutional administration (p. 211). These new challenges effectively tested the borders of the previously agreed upon developments of social policies on multiple levels. In the German case, while new technologies galvanised the expansion of professions covered, the relatively unchanging overarching consensus was that not all workers should be placed in the same insurance scheme because life courses fundamentally differed (p. 172). The increased internationalisation of German economy also raised awareness that above and beyond protecting the vulnerable, the task of the emerging social state may in fact be to manage the *national economy* (pp. 185–186). This matched the British approach, which, though imperial in terms of its geographical spread, in fact covered *only* British citizens abroad, and foreign workers only *within Britain itself* (p. 193). By contrast, Italian policy seemed *prima facie* much more inclusive, covering all emigrant workers but also colonial subjects (p. 187). On a deeper level, however, inclusion was less clear as ideas about race, religion, and modernity effectively shut out certain minorities (pp. 190–191).

Chapter 6 maps the complex changes that occurred during the First World War and its immediate aftermath. Obviously not every facet of these profound changes could be included, so the author dwells on the major debates between risk pertaining to work and risks pertaining to the war. In a context of total war, whom to include and why is perhaps even more intricate than in 'conventional' unsettled times. New technologies such as automobiles resurfaced the older dilemma on the role of agency and fault. In addition, war veterans were an

immediately pressing problem, which most governments tried to tackle through their previous experience with accident compensation (p. 238). The common denominator was that military and economic mobilisation essentially eroded the divide between spheres of work and daily life (p. 248). According to Moses this represents an undeniable cornerstone of the change in the immediate post-war period, wherein the consequences of *occupational risk* became *social risks* that should be distributed across the national community and governed by the overarching nation-state (p. 252).

On the whole, Julia Moses's book impresses with its analytical clarity and in-depth historical narrative. By analysing the co-constitutive relationship of agency, structure, and process, the author offers a finely tuned analysis of the relationship between modernisation and social policy development focused on the level of accident compensation. In addition to contributing to an otherwise poorly explored area of welfare state history, the book's dialogue with conventional modernisation literature sends out the strong message that there is far more to welfare states than just an underlying social-democratic thinking [Kaufmann 2012].

Sergiu Delcea

Central European University, Vienna

sergiu.delcea@gmail.com

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Lukas Sustala: *Zu spät zur Party: Warum eine ganze Generation den Anschluss den verpasst*

Salzburg 2020: Ecwin Verlag, 168 pp.

In this book (the title of which translates as 'too late for the party'), the Austrian economist and journalist Lukas Sustala offers a differentiated view on inequalities between generations and the consequences for inter-generational justice. He illustrates why many people in Western societies no longer buy into the idea that their children will have it better than they did and elaborates on specific indicators in which millennials and younger cohorts are worse off than their parents or grandparents. Sustala supports his arguments with evidence on the effects of the Great Recession, which takes a central place in his narrative. In addition, he touches briefly on the European debt crisis, high debt levels, stagnating real wages, the climate crisis, and continued low growth rates and offers readers an insight into a long list of economic and social developments and does so in a language that is inviting even for those who may not have spent much time studying the issues at hand. This book offers a balanced analysis of the state of Western societies and the equality between generations.

The book has nine chapters. Chapter one deals with the Great Recession as well as the debt crisis in Europe and its consequences for the welfare and the labour market prospects of young adults and their employment biographies. Opening with an anecdote about the new labour market conditions after the Great Recession, the author sets the stage for his analysis. Sustala points out that this recession is not on its own responsible for the malaise, but he argues that high unemployment and bad working conditions during the early and formative years of adult life can lead to smaller life-time earnings. Referring also to low economic growth, Sustala shows that the circumstances at the beginning of working life were comparatively bad for the generations born after 1980 (p. 17), so that for many entry into the labour market was delayed and then only temporary jobs with small benefits and little employment protection were on offer.

In the next two chapters, Sustala addresses the rationale for distinguishing between generations, the demographic change of ageing societies, and redistributive concerns between the generations. He argues that the generation category has scientific value because it is possible to distinguish with relative clarity how generations will fare in different phases of life – for example, in terms of how hard the competition will be on the labour market – relying on demographic data and on the economic situation [see also Vanhuyse and Goerres 2012]. Sustala points to two issues that he sees as connected to the phenomenon of ageing societies. He explains how the bigger size and higher voting turnout of older generations and the accumulation of national debt that is only rarely taken up to finance investments into the future are cause and symptom of an imbalance in politics between younger and older generations. He further argues that the generational contract – redistributing resources between different generations on a run-