

ers will find many points in common with the European reality of long-term care provision, not least since most carers are women and many among them migrants. Unfortunately, lower wages and lower status are also among the common points that readers will find between carers on both sides of the Atlantic.

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Petr Kopecký, Peter Mair and Maria Spirova (eds.): *Party Patronage and Party Government in European Democracies*

Oxford 2012: Oxford University Press, 434 pp.

Here is a challenge: how would one design the model piece of research in comparative politics? First the topic. It would have to be a foundational but also—and this part is key!—seemingly intractable problem in the field, one that has sparked several generations of literature and debate. This problem should encompass a complex, multi-faceted political phenomenon involving multiple actors; it should be at least partially

amenable to (competing) economic and sociological explanations; and it should be something that participants and observers often describe in terms of culture. To really make things interesting, this phenomenon should also possess a whiff of the illicit, making it hard to observe directly.

Having identified such a topic, the next step would be to collect data—original data, needless to say. Because we are thinking in the realm of the ideal here, the data should be cross-national. The number of cases should be large enough to quiet any critics of small-N analysis. Yet because there are strong arguments to be made that case-specific dynamics are in play, the data collection will require deep knowledge of local context, history, and language. At this point, it is clear that we are not talking about a researcher but a research team. Since this is (for now) a thought experiment, let us specify that each country case in the study will have its own researcher, or even researchers, who can collect original data using the requisite languages and who understand(s) each case's intricacies and historical context. To ensure that the case studies are comparable, let us require that the researchers agree on a common research protocol. They use the same definitions; ask the same questions in their interviews; study the same institutions; and employ the same measures.

It is the rare work that meets these standards. Happily, Kopecký, Mair, and Spirova's study of political party patronage in Europe is one of them. Patronage politics is surely the kind of beguiling but elusive topic just described, and equally surely, this book will stand as the most definitive empirical account of the phenomenon, at least in Europe, for the foreseeable future. Simply showing that it is possible to make sense of the hugely diverse range of patronage politics encompassed within Europe using one analytical framework is an act of theoretical daring. Yet, as I will describe below, the authors also make a

provocative argument that the nature of patronage is shifting, from a resource used to win elections to an instrument for governing the state.

This book began as a research workshop under the aegis of the European Consortium for Political Research in 2006, and its organisation reflects these origins. At its heart are fifteen country chapters, covering the full swathe of European democracies: Scandinavian, Southern European, post-communist, Anglo, and continental. There are two short introductory chapters laying out the theoretical goals and describing the methodology. A concluding chapter aggregates and analyses the country data to show the common trends.

The book's heart is in its country chapters, however. Each offers an inventory of that particular state: its central ministries, its non-departmental agencies and commissions (i.e. regulatory and policy advising agencies, and executing institutions). Each is based on approximately 40–50 interviews with country experts (state officials, academics, journalists, and others) conducted between 2006 and 2008. Using a standardised questionnaire each country's experts assess the level of patronage (across how much of the state does it extend, and within each part how far down?); the motivation for patronage (material reward or policy control), the criteria for recruitment into the state administration (professional qualifications, political allegiance, or personal allegiance); and last, whether patronage is monopolised by the government parties or shared with the opposition. Based on this survey, the authors compute an index of patronage enabling cross-national comparison. Each chapter also provides a historical overview of state consolidation and civil service reform as well as a primer on the basic structure of the party system.

In short, there is a *wealth* of material here, and it seems churlish to criticise so rich a contribution. However, in the spirit of the loyal opposition, I will raise the fol-

lowing points. For one, as I worked my way through the country chapters, I sometimes found it difficult to keep track of the relevant details across cases. I found myself, for example, wishing for some measure of the extent to which the actual practice of patronage in a given political system diverges from the legitimate powers that parties have to appoint within the state administration. Presumably, patronage that is clientelistic and corrosive of state capacity occurs when such divergence is very large. I also would have liked some readily comparable measure of bureaucratic turnover following elections, especially those with government alternation. It may be that the authors considered such measures and rejected them as unworkable; however, they would have facilitated the comparisons.

Now to a broader point. The authors have made every effort to avoid the criticism so often levelled at edited volumes that the individual contributions wander off theme and that their separate findings do not add up. Yet in avoiding the Scylla of overly loose chapter contributions, the volume may have drifted unwittingly to the Charybdis of too-rigid structure. Each chapter's scope and organisation follows a tightly constructed template that focuses with laser-like attention on the details of that case. While this accrues all of the analytical rewards of cross-case comparability described earlier, the country chapters only rarely reference each other. This hampers those chapters' ability to tell causal stories about their particular case. They can and do make use of over-time change to investigate hypotheses suggested by process-tracing, but they are hamstrung by not pursuing cross-national comparisons. This leads to tantalising but unexplored paths, such as the suggestion that in Ireland the practice of party patronage was dampened because of the presence of the Catholic Church, which enjoyed considerable political influence of its own. This thought cries out for a comparison with

other European countries where the church historically played a similarly pivotal role in politics. The country studies abound with potential causal leads such as this. The varying efficacy of civil service codes or the effect of party system type on patronage practice spring to mind. But as one contributor puts it in her chapter, 'It is naturally difficult to assess the relative importance of the causes discussed when there is only one case to refer to' (p. 118).

What, then, are the general findings? The concluding chapter compiles and compares the country-level assessments of the extent of patronage, its precise location within the state, and the mechanisms by which it occurs. Not surprisingly, some of the patterns are ambiguous. First, it proves hard to generalise about where within the state patronage is located. Its locus tends to be the central ministries, but beyond that there is no systematic pattern: in some countries, the finance ministry is the most politicised, while in others it belongs to the most insulated—and the same could be said for just about any policy area. The second general finding concerns the overall geography of patronage, which conforms for the most part with what we would expect. Greece, the patronage leader, is in a league of its own. The Scandinavian states are among the least patronage infused. There are some surprises when it comes to geography, however. Post-communist countries notch generally middling scores on the index—even with or better than Germany. The authors do not make too much of these cross-national differences, though, reflecting perhaps an unwillingness to put too much faith in them, at least as quantitative indicators. The third general finding is that the level of patronage appears to be declining, though this claim is advanced somewhat tentatively because of the ambiguities noted above and because, at least at the aggregate level, the research design is cross-sectional not longitudinal.

The most provocative finding, as I indicated earlier, is about the nature of patronage. For all their nuance, the data make one point abundantly clear: patronage as a means of winning elections through 'the exchange of various public goods for electoral support' (that is, patronage as an electoral resource, p. 4) is being replaced by patronage as a means by which parties build 'organizational networks in the public and semi-public sphere' (patronage as an organisational resource, p. 7). Put differently, state politicisation is now rarely about personal enrichment, but about better control of policy. Patronage's beneficiaries are neither party hacks nor even those who can deliver elections; they are policy professionals who happen to be politically affiliated. It is not the party in central office that places its cronies in the state administration. Far more likely, the minister appoints colleagues that she knows from her policy or professional circle and, in doing so, is only indirectly cognizant of party considerations. In this view, patronage is better thought of as just another kind 'party-state linkage'. It need not even be corrupt or illegitimate, as the term usually implies. Indeed, as Kopecký and Mair write in the introduction, 'it is the open and above board type of [state] appointment that is of greatest interest to this volume' (p. 8). Certainly, they find a lot of evidence for the shift to organisational patronage. Across their cases professionalism trumps material reward as the motivation for state appointments. Regarding the qualifications for state jobs, outside of Greece and Hungary under Viktor Orbán, they find that professionalism invariably outclasses political or personal allegiance. A number of contributors describe an even more attenuated form of patronage—'bureaucratic patronage'—whereby the ministry staff present their own preferred candidates to the minister for hiring.

In drawing together and interpreting all of their country-level data, the authors

faced, one senses, a big decision. Would they attempt to exploit the variation among cases to test causal inferences, or would they use the wealth of evidence to build a composite picture of patronage in contemporary Europe? The first option would allow them to wade into debates that have long roiled the field. For example, what explains variation in the extent of patronage across countries? Is it the nature of the party system, the timing of democratisation vis-à-vis state consolidation [Shefter 1994], the adoption of civil service reforms, or something else? Despite the depth and quality of the data collected, this option is daunting because the number of potential causal variables is large given the disparate set of cases on offer. The second option, building a composite picture, is tempting because the chief feature of that picture, the strength and breadth of the shift from electoral to organisational patronage, is so striking.

As I read, I was increasingly reminded of Bernard Silberman's classic study of state-building and bureaucratic legitimation *Cages of Reason* [1993]. Silberman memorably distinguished between the American and continental—especially French—modes of state-building. The latter was predicated on the Weberian conception of insulated career civil servants. The American mode was based on short stints of public service by professionals whose accreditation typically was established in the private sphere (lawyers, doctors, actuaries, etc.). In the fluid American model, the passage of these professionals back and forth between the public and private sectors was given largely by the flow of electoral fortunes. If bureaucratic rationality is understood in terms of professional and effective administration, Silberman's innovation was to grasp that the American 'patronage' model of state-building could be just as rational as the continental one. Even if the details of Silberman's story and that in the volume reviewed here sometimes differ,

the logic and overall narrative arc are immediately recognisable. Welcome, Europe, to the new iron cage.

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**Hanspeter Kriesi, Sandra Lavenex,
Frank Esser, Jörg Matthes, Marc
Bühlmann and Daniel Bochsler:**
*Democracy in the Age of Globalization
and Mediatization*

Basingstoke 2013: Palgrave Macmillan,
250 pp.

This book presents the intermediate results of a major Swiss research programme called 'Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century' that was established in 2005 and is intended to run for twelve years. The programme involves 85 researchers from seven disciplines working at twenty partner institutions and commands a budget of approximately twelve million euro. Since its inception the research programme has produced nearly 400 publications (for further details see <http://www.nccr-democracy.uzh.ch>). Synthesising and focusing a multi-disciplinary research programme of these dimensions is a Herculean task that, if pursued successfully, promises to leave its mark on the field. It is against this backdrop that the current volume has to be read.

The volume is divided into two parts. The first part ('Democracy—a Moving Target of Great Complexity and Variability') develops the conceptual framework, sets